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ABSTRACT 
Meta-rules, or rules for making rules, determine the costs of innovation and thus the 
pace of economic growth. Adapting rules to a changing economic environment through 
explicit, well-designed meta-rules makes economic growth quicker, less painful, and more 
certain than adapting rules through chance-based evolution. 
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I. Introduction: North Re-examined 
Two concepts are at the heart of North's theory of economic growth ( 1970). He calls 
the first "secondary institutions," defined as rules or property rights. This essay calls these 
simply rules. North calls the second concept "fundamental institutions," defined as "the basic 
'ground rules' such as the underlying 'constitutional' basis of property rights and basic 
decision rules with respect to political decision-making (1970, p. 10)." This essay calls these 
meta-rules, that is, rules for making rules. 1 The term institution here refers to a collection of 
rules, including perhaps meta-rules. An economy is a collection of institutions governing the 
allocation of resources and the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and 
technologies. 
North suggests that the growth of Western Europe resulted from "cumulative changes 
in secondary institutional arrangements [rules] (that) ultimately led to a restructuring of 
fundamental institutions [meta-rules] (1970, p. 10)." The accumulation of de facto rules 
embodying practical, grass-roots responses to changing material and technological conditions 
eventually led to revolutionary changes in formal meta-rules, channelling incentives away 
from activities that served to redistribute income and toward activities that raised the 
productivity of income-generating activities. Economic growth resulted. 
1 For example, the law setting the majority required to pass a new law is a meta-rule. 
There are at least three reasons for preferring the usage of meta as a prefix which indicates 
that the concept signified by the root word acts upon that same concept itself. First, the usage 
is easily adapted to multiple levels of self-modification, such as meta-meta-rules. Second, 
unlike North's terminology, the practice generalizes sensibly in diverse contexts: second 
derivatives are meta-derivatives, compound interest is meta-interest, teacher education is meta-
education, and consciousness is meta-thought. Third, the usage is common in the study of 
cognition and genetics (e.g., Hofstadter, 1979, pp. 687-688). 
Long-run growth requires that economies adapt their rules to changing material and 
technological conditions. Meta-rules determine the costs of adaptation and thus the pace of 
economic growth. North submits that economic growth resulted when informal changes in 
rules led to changes in meta-rules; this essay submits that continuing economic growth can be 
facilitated if changes in rules are guided by explicit, consciously designed meta-rules. 
Economic growth would be quicker, less painful, and more certain if rules (and meta-rules) 
evolve gradually and consciously under the guidance of meta-rules than if revolutionary 
changes in meta-rules follow from haphazard, evolutionary, ad hoc changes in rules 
themselves. 
This essay is organized as follows. Section II introduces a useful analogy, that 
institutions are to economies as genes are to species. Section III discusses the design of meta-
rules, and Section IV discusses some of the potential benefits and dangers of the conscious 
manipulation of meta-rules. 
II. lnstitutions;economies II genes;species 
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Just as institutions are collections of rules that constrain and direct the behavior of 
economic agents by specifying rights and methods to allocate, benefit from, transform, and 
transfer resources to satisfy preferences, genes are collections of rules that constrain and direct 
the behavior of living organisms by specifying actions and abilities to find, secure, and use 
resources to satisfy physiological wants. 
Both institutions and genes embody meta-rules because they specify how to modify 
themselves. For example, a constitution may provide for its own amendment, or genes may 
provide for their own recombination. At a deeper level, economies and species may modify 
how they modify themselves and thus embody meta-meta-rules. For example, the majority 
required to amend a constitution may itself be amended, or asexual mutations may a lead a 
species to produce genetic variation by sexual recombination. 
Because the environment changes constantly, economies, just like species, evolve or 
die. As expressed by North (1994, p. 367), "It is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency 
which is the key to long-run growth. Successful political/economic systems have evolved 
flexible institutional structures that can survive the shocks and changes ... " Meta-rules may 
exist to facilitate the adaptation of rules, but meta-rules may be non-existent, as with a 
constitution that does not provide for its own amendment, or ossified, as with a constitution 
amended so that all future amendments must pass unanimously. 
1. Meta-rules and development 
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For both species and economies, development may be defined as self-modification that 
promotes short-run survival without compromising the long-run ability to self-modify further. 
Just as a mule can withstand hostile environments but is an evolutionary dead-end, a rule may 
promote short-run economic growth but, without luck or a meta-rule, will eventually lead to 
stagnation and decline as the economic environment changes and the rule becomes increasingly 
inappropriate. "Societies that get 'stuck' embody belief systems and institutions that fail to 
confront and solve new problems of social complexity (North, 1994, p. 364)." 
A rule without a meta-rule is like a contract that does not specify how to recontract. 
Changes can be made, but they will depend on bargaining power rather than on rights, occur 
abruptly rather than continuously, rely on luck rather than on design, and perhaps arrive too 
late to salvage the life of the contract or the health of the economy. 
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2. Meta-rules and death 
Why do people die of old age? Understanding how the death of individuals can 
promote the survival of the species sheds light on the role of meta-rules in economic 
development. 
Although the environment never stops changing, the genes of an individual are fixed 
forever at conception. The average member of a younger generation should have some genetic 
advantage over the average member of an older generation because the genes of the younger 
generation have benefitted from more rounds of natural selection, rounds occurring in the 
most current (and thus most relevant) environments.2 Because resources are scarce and 
because older individuals of a species are less well-suited to the environment than are younger 
individuals, the survival of the species is promoted if older individuals die and free up 
resources for younger individuals. 
The faster the environment changes or the more a species depends on instinct or on 
physical features for survival, the more frequently variation is needed, the closer the spacing 
between generations, and the shorter the life span. Evolution selected for humans who, in the 
span of 35 to 40 years, could reproduce, teach basic skills to their children, and die, freeing 
up resources. The success of humans can be attributed to the evolution of features (such as 
lips, thumbs, the cerebral cortex, and culture) providing a generalized ability to adapt. 
2 Members of the older generation presumably reproduce after self-selecting by some 
signal of suitability to the environment, usually physical health. Members of the older 
generation poorly suited to the environment should be less healthy and thus should have less 
reproductive success. 
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In fact, adjusting to changes in the environment through learning has overtaken genetic 
variation as the most efficient adaptation strategy for humans. 3 Instinct and passive learning 
through trial and error are not no longer adequate for humans; purposeful education is 
required. Economies are no different. The unconscious evolution of rules has little hope of 
keeping pace with accelerating changes in the economic environment; the conscious design of 
meta-rules can improve the odds. 
Although the survival of species requires the death of individuals, the survival of 
economies need not require the death of institutions. The birth of a completely new set of 
institutions at a constitutional convention is appropriate only if a polity wishes to bury the 
lessons embodied in the institutions being replaced. In other cases, some of the rules within the 
set of rules that comprise an institution may be changed without conceiving the entire 
institution again from scratch. Meta-rules facilitate orderly adjustment. 
ill. The Desip of Meta-rules 
Individuals must die to make room for new models, but institutions can replace parts 
piece-meal. Institutions are not conscious, nor do they anticipate the future, but they may be 
designed so as to be affected by human consciousness and expectations for the future. 
Although humans cannot redesign themselves, they can redesign institutions, especially if the 
institutions were created with redesign in mind. There is room for reform of meta-rules 
because they are not always explicit nor carefully designed. 
3 Because mental capital matters more than corporal capital and because an individual's 
mental capital is lost at death, the survival of the human species would probably be promoted 
by longer lives than those that result from the current genetic blueprint, appropriate for an 
environment that has long since passed away. 
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1. Explicit Meta-rules 
Meta-rules are often understood rather than stated. According to North, "The 
fundamental institutions [meta-rules] may be specified in a constitution or may exist by legal 
precedent or perhaps only by custom. Sometimes the way these fundamental institutions can be 
changed is specified [meta-meta-rules], as in the rules for amendment of a formal constitution, 
but more often they are not (1970, p. 10)." Implicit meta-rules are more likely to be opaque 
than are explicit ones. Rent-seekers can subvert customs more easily than codes. 
The transition economies of Eastern Europe provide an example. The leaders of the 
early communist state did not foresee their shortsightedness, and they did not provide a 
peaceful way to change the government or the economic system. Making up the rules as they 
go means almost as many errors as trials. 
A second example are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that lend to 
microenterprises in developing countries. The donor agencies and social workers who 
conceived these institutions never foresaw that the flow of soft money would slow to a trickle 
and that survival would require profitability. Without a built-in guide to transformation, the 
metamorphosis to for-profit institutions is extremely painful, and many NGOs will die. 
2. Designed Meta-rules 
A weakness of evolution is that variation depends on chance, and there is always the 
chance that no new well-adapted entity will develop. To mitigate this, species encourage 
serendipity by systematically producing genetic variation. Economies can likewise encourage 
systematic adaptation by consciously equipping institutions with meta-rules. 
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Individuals and institutions have some capacity to adapt even in the absence of genetic 
variation or meta-rules. 4 But just as evolution does not produce all useful adaptations, the 
institution of the market does not produce a complete set of rules. The economic environment 
changes too fast for the unconscious adaptive ability of institutions. 
Institutional design should recognize that design cannot anticipate all contingencies. 
Therefore, design should provide for changing the design. Non-conscious meta-rules change 
rules too slowly and too haphazardly. As expressed by North (1994, p. 364), "Human beings 
have, by trial and error, learned how to make economies perform better; but not only has this 
learning taken ten millennia (since the first economic revolution), it has still escaped the grasp 
of almost half the world's population." 
IV. Potential Benefits and Dan~:ers of Meta-rules 
Explicit, designed meta-rules should make policy reform more gradual, practical, and 
peaceful. Crisis is required to trigger policy reform only if the system cannot adapt itself 
gradually to small disequilibria. Designed evolution has several advantages over the dialectical 
revolution of Marxian/Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis: 
• It is peaceful rather than violent; 
• It is gradual and continuous rather than sporadic and abrupt; 
• It provides for mid-stream redirection to avoid overshooting the target or throwing 
out the good with the bad. 
4 For example, muscles (and presumably brain interconnections) develop with use. In the 
case of institutions, informal practices may circumvent useless or counterproductive formal 
rules. 
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If policy reform is worthwhile because changing rules acts as a lever that multiplies the 
potential of efforts to improve welfare, the design of meta-rules should be even more attractive 
because it acts as a lever of levers that exponentiates the potential to improve welfare. 
Unfortunately, meta-rules also exponentiate the potential to damage to welfare with 
poor policy. Just as tinkering with Nature can produce monsters, meta-rules attract both 
reformers and rent-seekers. Designing meta-rules that balance protection from rent-seeking 
against openness to reform is no easy trick. 5 Too much flexibility leads to instability, and 
policies that are easy to correct are easy to subvert. Eliminating flexibility would reduce rent-
seeking but would also fossilize all rules and doom an economy to extinction. If any or all 
rules can be changed at any or all times, the transactions costs of considering potential changes 
could outweigh the benefits of being able to make changes. If modifications are unlimited, 
potential rules may never become actual rules. 6 
Even explicit, designed meta-rules may not promote economic growth. In fact, North 
(1970, p. 7) suggests that many (if not most) meta-rules serve to reduce the efficiency of the 
economy. Meta-rules may facilitate changing rules to redistribute income to rent-seekers in 
addition to (or instead of) increasing the productivity of income-generating activities. For 
example, the ruling party in Puerto Rico recently designed a bill to increase the number of 
judges in its Supreme Court from seven to nine. Had this proposed meta-rule been passed, 
5 The bitter debates over the centralization of power in a federalist European Union are an 
example. 
6 This is why Congress tied its own hands by giving fast-track authority to GA TI. 
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neither productivity nor adaptability would have increased, but the party in power would have 
graven its position into future rule-making. 
There are some principles or safeguards for the design of meta-rules. First, not all 
rules can be subject to meta-rules. At the end of a meta- ... -meta-rule chain, there must be 
either an unchangeable rule (such as the decisions of a Supreme Court) or a meta-rule that acts 
on itself (such as a majority required to amend laws that also applies to the majority required 
to amend the majority required). 
Second, irreversible rules (such as treaties with other polities) should be more difficult 
to establish that reversible rules. 
Third, rent-seeking can be reduced if the (untradable) weight given to any individual in 
the political process corresponds to the individual's weight in the social welfare function. For 
example, utilitarianism should provide for simple majority rule with one vote per person. 
Wealth should not be allowed to influence voting because individual utilities are not weighted 
by wealth in the social welfare function. 
Meta-rules may backfire. This will occur less often, however, if meta-rules are 
designed, rather than left to Nature, and explicit, rather than implied. Conscious design of 
meta-rules may lead to the adaptation of rules to the ever-changing economic environment at a 
pace conducive to survival and perhaps even growth. 
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